

# Severe Consequences of a Misconfiguration

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
Leading web security solution



# About Me

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- Security researcher at Acunetix
- Web security enthusiast / pentester  
<https://github.com/GrrrDog/>  
<https://twitter.com/antyurin>
- Co-organizer of Defcon Russia 7812  
<https://t.me/DCG7812>



# “Signed” Cookie

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A cookie with a signature (MAC)  
Data tampering with known secret

# “Signed” Cookie

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A cookie with a signature (MAC)

sess=`eyJ0ZXN0IjoieMTIzIn0.XbLGjw.y2xE2iy_LsK816oy4Scm8O9Ve4A`

`eyJ0ZXN0IjoieMTIzIn0.XbLGjw` - value (data.timestamp)

`y2xE2iy_LsK816oy4Scm8O9Ve4A` - MAC/signature

`eyJ0ZXN0IjoieMTIzIn0` - Base64({"test":"123"})

`y2xE2iy_LsK816oy4Scm8O9Ve4A` - Base64(HMAC-SHA1(`value`))

# MAC

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HMAC(**secret**, **value** )

- Hash function (MD5, SHA1, etc)
- No secret? No valid signature
- Data tampering protection

# Why?

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- The cookie is on the client side
- Store session data in the cookie
- Load balancing
- etc.

# Frameworks/libraries

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- Flask
  - Django
  - Web2py
  - RoR
  - ...
- Express
  - Shiro
  - Mojolicious
  - JWT \*
  - ...

# Variations (URL decoded)

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eyJ0ZXN0IjoieMTIzIn0.XbLGjw.y2xE2iy\_LsK816oy4Scm8O9Ve4A

.ejyrVipJLS5RslJKHDigpAN2hNEAu6IWACPhY5E.XbQZOW.4zw650xetB13gaCDzvAD6JULMGA

s:JH9Gp4UKbN3JOCPQG0AI1H8sFw4VCu0l.llxo+WcGgg4tSX2Ni8koj6Ni5ledF2AKyo2d995+3M

c4e1213a0f6fdd6281718ee0211aab40:2UPUY95IyOA2jY-  
3N0\_FLQtCTZPDlaBEqszVb5jHTcmqqWYIEpfvMD5NU8gfm5nnPcWyVZZRynFCilwiokXIzzYC1eV  
4Vub2ihHvZYWSsQPvBuNrGtUdOjwrLQ-  
3QFM7ZsnHL6FFFENwY28U36RL1RerNftbLg13c5SzytUp7mK6ojgZvaBjHPYllvkOHITjK0RPqasp  
OPQ\_2XIZvb9XCs-8HgZIG0ltdUBeAdmzR6bj23yPdKy\_IzCz5PO4mh-  
KiyYeKqPosF7qJbsKQlglfvrgD1lcGXgq5i3yczQ9QvGwyjwiV0JwOji9mJ4F6BRq



# Consequences

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## Authentication bypass

### PeopleSoft - ERP

- PS\_TOKEN cookie – SSO
- The cookie contains user name
- TokenChpoken attack <https://bit.ly/2NiUjwX>
- Node password => PS Admin
  - UserID
  - Language Code
  - Date and Time Issued
  - Issuing System – Node name
  - Signature = SHA1\_Hash ( UserID + Lang + Date Time issued + Issuing System + Node Password )

# Consequences

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## Deserialization

- Web frameworks serialize objects to values in cookies

### web2py (CVE-2016-3957)

- Uses Python's Pickle
- RCE as a feature
- <https://devco.re/blog/2017/01/03/web2py-unserialize-code-execution-CVE-2016-3957/>

# Consequences

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## Deserialization

- Web frameworks serialize objects to values in cookies

## Apache Shiro (CVE-2016-4437) \*

- Uses Java native binary serialization
- RCE using gadgets
- \* - encrypted
- <https://www.seebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-92180>

# Consequences

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Nothing?

- Express express-session
  - "s:base64(value):base64(hmac-sha256)"
  - value – random id
- Detect framework

# Secret

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Where does it come from?

- Secure random value
- Developer must set it (!!!)
  - No value
  - Hardcoded value
  - Insecure generation

# How to Get the Secret?

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## Bruteforce – HashCat

Hashmode: 150 – HMAC-SHA1

GeForce GTX 1080 Ti – 2410.7 MH/s

a-zA-Z0-9, length – 8: 24 hours

- Long values could reduce the speed

<https://github.com/siseci/hashcat-benchmark-comparison/>

# How to Get the Secret?

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## Documentation/examples

- Hardcoded (default) value
- Insecure generation
  - Secret == filename main file
  - Secret == main package name
- People like copying code

# BigQuery and GitHub

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## Google BigQuery

- NoSQL, SQL, BigData, MapReduce...
- BigQuery engine or Cloud Dataflow engine
- Can process huge amounts of data super fast
  
- 1 TB/mo for free + 300\$
  
- A bunch of examples:  
<https://medium.com/google-cloud/github-on-bigquery-analyze-all-the-code-b3576fd2b150>



# BigQuery and GitHub

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## Google BigQuery

- Public dataset of GitHub public repositories
- Over 3M GitHub repositories
  
- $3 \times 10^9$  files
- About 3 TB of data
- Updated weekly
  
- <https://console.cloud.google.com/marketplace/details/github/github-repos>

# BigQuery and GitHub

## bigquery-public-data.github\_repos.files

48	crowdtap/clearance	refs/heads/master	spec/rails_root/vendor/plugins/clearance	40960	0ec7299e4a35db3cc31b820318e9629d3691fae1
49	mcezpiel/introduction	refs/heads/master	node_modules/montage	57344	601f849e86150f427ebe49bef8317b3fcf4488f2
50	Bilb/vtm	refs/heads/master	vtm-ext-libs	57344	194dac648666d3e6aac3fd8fbee05684718fa156
51	Bilb/vtm	refs/heads/master	appcompat	57344	eead2062deaeda844de58777247f517427459e0d
52	Bilb/vtm	refs/heads/master	jni/jni/libtess2	57344	a43504d78a5695ca07cf3706e34abdfd5b4343b
53	AEinsam/HabReader	refs/heads/master	AndroidBillingLibrary	57344	3ecc7cad9cb6ca55d0de607e03b717876212178d
54	AEinsam/HabReader	refs/heads/master	ActionBarSherlock	57344	9598f2bb2ceed4a834cd5586a903f270ca4c0ccc
55	AEinsam/HabReader	refs/heads/master	SlidingMenu	57344	ef53ae599e3c470a97161c7d0a97255d0ff18610
56	PaoloW8/android_kernel_nubia_nx505j	refs/heads/cm12.1	arch/microblaze/boot/dts/system.dts	40960	7cb657892f21229d0068d2e7416e91e551264f77
57	snowplow/dev-environment	refs/heads/master	ansible-playbooks	57344	d99126e9aab548cc434e83aa2ef1121a5fec0930
58	benderTheCrime/django-app-flag	refs/heads/master	include/python2.7	40960	3fe034fccc4d0415e58e049aaf9174ec86bdaf89
59	Relearn/closedloopcoast-client	refs/heads/master	node_modules/.bin/json2dsv	40960	a4e6866fe57f697afccb4e7f6282485a8d8cfcac
..					

# BigQuery and GitHub

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```
SELECT * FROM  
  `bigquery-public-data.github_repos.files`  
  WHERE ENDS_WITH(path, '.java')
```

- Query settings -> Set a destination table for query results
- Allow large results (no size limit)

# BigQuery and GitHub

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## SQL / legacy SQL

```
SELECT * FROM `bigquery-public-data.github_repos.sample_files`  
WHERE ENDS_WITH(path, '.java')
```

```
SELECT * FROM [bigquery-public-data:github_repos.files]  
WHERE RIGHT(path, 5) = '.java'
```

# BigQuery and GitHub

## bigquery-public-data.github\_repos.contents

19	6ae35d269efe02a749d22da48337a3e30f1db6ab	1552	<pre>import java.util.*;  package com.vivifram.second.hitalk.bean.parser;  import com.avos.avoscloud.AVObject; import com.avos.avoscloud.AVUser; import com.vivifram.second.hitalk.bean.blackboard.BnCommentRemote; import com.vivifram.second.hitalk.bean.blackboard.BnItem; import com.vivifram.second.hitalk.bean.blackboard.BnRemote; import com.vivifram.second.hitalk.bean.blackboard.CommentItem;</pre>
20	d355185aca6c8ba968cdbb9ad30b18d7f8c22c0a	627	<pre>package com.matt.taskel.tasks;  import com.matt.taskel.logging.Level; import com.matt.taskel.util.FileUtil;  public class SetupForge extends Task {      public SetupForge()</pre>

# BigQuery and GitHub

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```
#legacySQL
SELECT content.restr, files.repo_name, files.ref, files.path
FROM (
  SELECT

      REGEXP_EXTRACT(line, r'([\s]*\'cookieValidationKey\'\s*=>\s.+)') AS restr

FROM (

  SELECT SPLIT(content, '\n') AS line
  FROM [github_extracts.all_php_contents] )

  HAVING restr IS NOT NULL ) AS content
JOIN [github_extracts.all_php_files] AS files
ON content.id = files.id
```

# Search in Docker Containers

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- Inside the container

```
docker run -it schmunk42/yii2-app-basic /bin/bash
```

```
find . -name *.php -print0 | xargs -0 grep "cookieValidationKey"
```

- No bash/find installed

# Search in Docker Containers

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- On the host system

```
docker create schmunk42/yii2-app-basic
```

```
docker export container_id > yii2.tar
```

```
zgrep -a "cookieValidationKey" yii2.tar
```

if we need a filename:

```
tar xaf yii2.tar --to-command="awk -e '/cookieValidationKey/  
{print ENVIRON[\"TAR_FILENAME\"] \":\", \"$0}\""
```



# Found Secrets

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- Depends on frameworks
- 30-15000
- 15-3000 uniques
- Secret leakage

# Why?

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```
awk -F ',' '{print $1}' secrets.csv | sort | uniq -c | sort
```

- Frameworks on frameworks
- Templates/"builders"
- Vulnerable apps
- Common dictionary
- "Change this immediately" -> "changed"
- Tests

# Results

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## 1. Yii2

500 random sites -> 12 secrets (3 spec)

## 1. Flask

200 random sites -> 18 secrets (4 spec)

## 1. TBA

60 random sites -> 2 secrets (2 spec)

# Universal Detector

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How many variations?

1) Separators: :, ., --, no sep

1) Sign position: prefix, suffix

1) Format: hex, (urlsafe)base64

1) HMAC: MD5, SHA1, SHA256 (SHA\*)

# Universal Detector

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## Approach:

- 1) Detect sign (regexs + length)
- 1) Separate value
- 1) Dictionary attack on the value

# Universal Detector

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Results on 2k BugBounty sites:

- Detected: 130
- "Unknown" format: 3
- Secrets: 0 ^\_^

# More

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More info later:

- <https://github.com/GrrrDog/>
- <https://twitter.com/antyyurin>

# Thank you

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Leading web security solution

